General purpose E-commerce system by Shamieh, Musa & Yahya, Mohamed
See	discussions,	stats,	and	author	profiles	for	this	publication	at:	https://www.researchgate.net/publication/251812529
General	Purpose	E-commerce	System
Article	·	June	2007
CITATION
1
READS
12
2	authors,	including:
Adnan	Yahya
Birzeit	University
41	PUBLICATIONS			439	CITATIONS			
SEE	PROFILE
All	in-text	references	underlined	in	blue	are	linked	to	publications	on	ResearchGate,
letting	you	access	and	read	them	immediately.
Available	from:	Adnan	Yahya
Retrieved	on:	15	August	2016
Birzeit Uiversity
Faculty Of Engineering
Computer Systems Engineering Department
General Purpose E-commerce System
With Focus on Payment Systems
Prepared by:
Musa Shamieh
Mohamed Yahya
Supervised by:
Dr. Adnan Yahya
A graduation project submitted to the Computer Systems Engineering Department in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of B.Sc. in Computer Engineering
Birzeit
January 16, 2007
We declare that the work described in this document is, except where otherwise stated,
entirely our own work.
This document was typeset using LYX and LATEX.
* * * *
To my Mother and Father (I would have listed my advisor, but he doesn’t like redundancy!)
- Mohamed Yahya
* * * *
Contents
Contents iv
List of Figures vii
List of Tables viii
Abstract ix
1. Introduction 1
1.1. Electronic Commerce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2. E-Commerce Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3. General Purpose E-Commerce Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.4. E-Commerce Payment Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4.1. Types of Payment Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4.2. Digital Cash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Encryption and Security 5
2.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.2. Security Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Symmetric Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.1. DES -The Data Encryption Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.2. Triple DES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3. Public-Key Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.1. RSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4. One-Way Hashing Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.5. Digital Signatures Using Public-Key Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.6. Secret Splitting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.7. Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3. Digital Cash Payment System 13
3.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.1.2. Blinding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1.3. Coin Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2. The Reusable Oﬄine Digital Cash Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2.1. Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
iv
CONTENTS
3.2.2. Payment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2.3. Deposit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2.4. Identification of Double Spenders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.3. Application of the Digital Cash Payment Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.3.1. Remote and Local Payment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.3.2. Remote Payment Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.3.3. Local Payment Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.4. Features of the System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4. Mobile Technology and Bluetooth 21
4.1. Mobile Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.1.1. Method of Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.1.2. Mobile Platforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.1.3. Symbian C++ vs. Java Micro Edition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.2. Bluetooth Technology from a Developer’s Point of View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.2.1. Bluetooth Protocol Stack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.2.2. Bluetooth Connection Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.2.3. Bluetooth Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.2.4. Bluetooth Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.2.4.1. Pairing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.2.4.2. Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.2.4.3. Cracking Bluetooth Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.2.4.4. Final Judgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5. Smart Card Technology 32
5.1. Advantages of Smart Cards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.1.1. Flexibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.1.2. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.2. Benefits of Smart Cards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.3. Comparison Between Several Types of Smart Cards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.3.1. Contact Smart Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.3.2. Contactless Smart Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.3.3. Combo Smart Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.3.4. Hybrid Smart Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.4. Smart Card Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.5. Smart card reader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.6. Memory and Microprocessor Smart Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.7. Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.8. Energy for smart card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.9. The data files in smart card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.10. Smart Card Operating System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Conclusion and Future Work 40
v
CONTENTS
Bibliography 41
A. List of Abbreviations A1
vi
List of Figures
1.1. System Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2.1. DES encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2. DES intermediate stages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3. EDE DES encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4. DED DES encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.5. Public-key cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.6. SSL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1. Digital cash payment system overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.2. Blinding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.3. Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.4. Payment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.5. Deposit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.6. Identifying Double Spenders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.7. Remote Payment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.8. Local Payment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.1. Bluetooth protocol stack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.2. Bluetooth packet format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.3. Service Discovery Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.4. Three piconets forming two scatternets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.5. Creation of the initialization key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.6. Generation of Kab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.7. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.1. Memory in smart cards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.2. Non-cryptographic smart cards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.3. Cryptographic smart card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.4. Smart card contact pads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.5. Smart card files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.6. Smart card file tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.7. Smart card file hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
vii
List of Tables
3.1. Key distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1. Comparison of different mobile platforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.2. Symbian C++ vs. J2ME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.1. Smart card contact pads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
viii
Abstract
E-commerce has seen huge growth in the past decade, one of the limitations on this grow is the
lack of suitable payment methods in many communities. In this report, we will take a general
look at e-commerce, e-commerce models and systems. We will also look at payment methods
suitable for e-commerce with a focus on digital cash. We will then describe and study a digital
cash system. We finally present the technologies used in the implementation of such a system.
ix

1. Introduction
This introductory chapter provides an overview of e-commerce. It will look at the definition of
e-commerce and the different e-commerce models. It then gives an overview of general purpose
e-commerce content management systems and e-commerce payment systems, where we focus
on the concept of digital cash. Our ultimate goal in this project is to develop a digital cash
payment solution suitable for general purpose e-commerce systems, an outline of the system is
shown in figure 3.1.
Figure 1.1.: System Overview
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1.1. Electronic Commerce
Electronic commerce (e-commerce) is the use of electronic systems, such as computer networks
or the Internet, in selling, buying and marketing products or services[1].
E-commerce can be distinguished from e-business, which is the digital enablement of firms in
a way not directly related to performing transactions. For example, a bookshop which uses a
Microsoft Excel spread sheet to keep track of its daily sales is involved in e-business. The same
book shop is not involved in e-commerce unless people can buy books online.
1.2. E-Commerce Models
Depending on who the buyer and the seller is, e-commerce can be put into one of four categories[2]:
Business to Consumer (B2C): This is the most well known e-commerce model. In it, businesses
target individual consumers. This model encompasses portals, online retailers and content
providers. Our project focuses on this e-commerce model.
Business to Business (B2B): This is by far the the largest form of e-commerce in terms of
sales. In it, businesses sell their products and services to other businesses.
Consumer to Consumer (C2C): In C2C commerce, individual consumers can buy and sell each
other through a third party. The most common form of C2C e-commerce is online auctions
such as eBay.
Peer to Peer (P2P): The only difference between the P2P and C2C models is that in the P2P
model no third party is involved between the individual customers. File sharing services
are the dominant form of P2P e-commerce.
1.3. General Purpose E-Commerce Systems
Our project’s focus is the development of a general purpose e-commerce system. At the core is
the e-commerce content management system which lets customers interact with the electronic
store to browse products and services, communicate with merchants, buy and pay for products.
Several such systems exist, many of which are available under open source licences. These
systems are largely complete and are in active use in several online stores. An important
decision in our project is which e-commerce content management system to use. Our decision
is mostly based on criteria related to the developer’s point of view.
We had to make a choice between the following e-commerce content management systems:
osCommerce, ZenCart, phpShop, CRE Loaded (standard). Both ZenCart and CRE Loaded are
based on osCommerce, they include some modifications which are not essential for our project
such as support of gift cards[3]. This means that modifying osCommerce will be simpler and
enables us to focus on the task at hand. osCommerce also has much better documentation
and support than its two descendants, with many books, manuals, installation and development
guides and forums dedicated to it. This leaves us with osCommerce vs. phpShop. Both have
similar functionality in many areas, but the ultimate decision was made based on the amount and
2
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quality of developer’s documentation available for each of the two systems. Here osCommerce
proved to be the better choice.
A complete list of features provided by osCommerce can be found on the project’s website[4].
The features include multilingual support, multi-currency support, multiple payment methods
including credit cards, PayPal and secure transactions with SSL. The system is also modular
which gives developers the ability to extend basic functionality by adding, for example, new
payment methods, new shipping methods and automatic backups.
1.4. E-Commerce Payment Systems
Several payment systems exist in the e-commerce world. Some of these are clearly dominant
like credit cards, some are showing strong potential like peer-to-peer payment systems. In this
section we will explore the different available systems. We will then shift our focus to a specific
type of payment system, digital cash.
1.4.1. Types of Payment Systems
The following systems are used in e-commerce:
1. Central credit accounts: This is the type of system represented by credit cards or debit
cards where the customer has a central account. To make a payment, the customer only
needs to give a token that identifies his account.
2. Online stored value: where users have an online account that they charge regularly. This
account is then used for e-commerce payments.
3. Accumulating balance systems: in which a customer is billed for his purchases periodically.
This is very common with digital content stores like iTunes, where the value of individual
items is very small.
4. Digital cash: Where a private entity generates its own form of currency that can be
exchanged for products and services online.
Our graduation project will focus on the development of a digital cash payment system for
e-commerce.
1.4.2. Digital Cash
Digital cash is a digital message which playes the role of money. It cannot be counterfeited
(easily) and can be reasonably verified by anyone accepting it as authentic[5]. Digital cash is
possible through the use of public-key cryptography which gives the ability to digitally sign a
message. Digital cash tries to imitate real cash. Okamoto and Ohta give six properties which
must be satisfied to provide the perfect digital cash system[6]:
1. Independence. The security of the digital cash is not dependent on any physical location.
The cash can be transferred through computer networks.
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2. Security. The digital cash cannot be copied and reused.
3. Privacy (Untraceability). The privacy of the user is protected; no one can trace the rela-
tionship between the user and his purchases.
4. Off-line Payment. When a user pays for a purchase with electronic cash, the protocol
between the user and the merchant is executed off-line. That is, the shop does not need
to be linked to a host to process the user’s payment.
5. Transferability. The digital cash can be transferred to other users.
6. Divisibility. A piece of digital cash in a given amount can be subdivided into smaller pieces
of cash in smaller amounts.
According to Okamoto and Ohta, providing a system that satisfies all six properties requires the
transfer of about 200 megabytes for a $356.27 transaction[6]. Other protocols which have been
developed mainly by Okamoto and Ohta are capable of satisfying five of these requirements at
a time. The main conflict occur between 3, 4 and 6. We later present the digital protocol we
will use which satisfies the first five properties.
The second property, security, is a very important one because unlike physical objects, copying
a digital message is a very easy task. This introduces the problem of double-spending where the
same digital coin is spent twice by the same person.
4
2. Encryption and Security
In this chapter we present the encryption and security protocols required for building our sys-
tem (presented in the next chapter). The discussion in this chapter is mostly based on Bruce
Schneier’s book, Applied Cryptography[7]. We will not present the development of these proto-
cols or provide detailed analysis of them. In this chapter we will assume that all messages are
exchanged between Alice and Bob1.
2.1. Introduction
2.1.1. Terminology
We need the security protocols to allow the sender to send a message to the receiver without
giving an eavesdropper the ability to see the contents of the message.
The sender usually has the message in plain text (M). In order to securely transmit it, he has
to encrypt it to produce the cipher text (C). When the receiver gets the cipher text, he decrypts
it to read the contents of the message.
The encryption operation is represented by the function E, which takes the plain text as input
and produces a cipher text.
E(M) = C
When the receiver wants to know the contents of the encrypted message, he has to apply the
decryption function D to the cipher text to produce the original plain text.
D(C) = M
The functions E and D together implement a cryptographic algorithm, also known as a cipher.
Most modern cryptographic algorithms are public, therefore the security of these algorithm
comes from the secrecy of the key (K) which is used in the encryption and decryption processes.
To account for the key in notation used above, we modify it as follows:
EK(M) = C
DK(C) = M
Depending on how keys are distributed, we end up with two classes of cryptographic algo-
rithms, public key and private key algorithms.
1The use of Alice and Bob is very common in cryptology, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alice_and_Bob
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2.1.2. Security Concepts
A truly secure system is expected to satisfy the following[8]:
Confidentiality The assurance that only the intended entities can read a message.
Authentication The assurance that an entity is who it is claiming to be.
Integrity The assurance that the message has not been altered.
Non-Repudiation The assurance that an entity cannot falsely deny sending a message.
2.2. Symmetric Cryptography
In symmetric cryptography, also known as secret-key cryptography, the same key is used for
both the encryption and decryption processes. If Alice wants to send a message to Bob, she
encrypts it and sends the cipher text to Bob. When Bob gets the cipher text, he decrypts it to
get the plain text. The same key is used for both processes.
EK(M) = C
DK(C) = M
The secrecy here depends on keeping the key K a secret. If either Alice or Bob loses the key,
then the whole system is broken. This means that Alice should trust Bob not to lose or give
away the key and the same applies to Bob.
2.2.1. DES -The Data Encryption Standard
Figure 2.2 shows an outline of DES.
Plain text is encrypted in blocks of 64 bits, yielding 64 bits of cipher text. The algorithm,
which is parametrized by a 56-bit key, has 19 distinct stages. The first stage is a key-independent
transposition on the 64-bit plain text. The last stage is the exact inverse of this transposition.
The stage prior to the last one exchanges the leftmost 32 bits with the rightmost 32 bits. The
remaining 16 stages are functionally identical but are parametrized by different functions of the
key. The algorithm has been designed to allow decryption to be done with the same key as
encryption. The steps are just run in the reverse order.
The operation of one of these intermediate stages is illustrated in figure 2.2.
Each stage takes two 32-bit inputs and produces two 32-bit outputs. The left output is simply
a copy of the right input. The right output is the bitwise XOR of the left input and a function
of the right input and the key for this stage, Ki. All the complexity lies in this function. The
function consists of four steps, carried out in sequence. First, a 48-bit number, E, is constructed
by expanding the 32-bit Ri - 1 according to a fixed transposition and duplication rule. Second,
E and Ki are XORed together. This output is then partitioned into eight groups of 6 bits each,
each of which is fed into a different S-box. Each of the 64 possible inputs to an S-box is mapped
onto a 4-bit output. Finally, these 8 x 4 bits are passed through a P-box.
6
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Figure 2.1.: DES encryption
In each of the 16 iterations, a different key is used. Before the algorithm starts, a 56-bit
transposition is applied to the key. Just before each iteration, the key is partitioned into two
28-bit units, each of which is rotated left by a number of bits dependent on the iteration number.
Ki is derived from this rotated key by applying yet another 56-bit transposition to it.A different
48-bit subset of the 56 bits is extracted and permuted on each round.
A technique that is sometimes used to make DES stronger is called whitening. It consists of
XORing a random 64-bit key with each plain text block before feeding it into DES and then
XORing a second 64-bit key with the resulting cipher text before transmitting it. Whitening
can easily be removed by running the reverse operations.
2.2.2. Triple DES
IBM realized that the DES key length was too short and devised a way to effectively increase
it, using triple encryption, the method is illustrated in figure 2.3 and 2.4.
Here two keys and three stages are used. In the first stage, the plain text is encrypted using
DES in the usual way with K1. In the second stage, DES is run in decryption mode, using K2
as the key. Finally, another DES encryption is done with K1.
Here we realized that we used only two keys instead of three, and we use EDE (Encrypt
7
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Figure 2.2.: DES intermediate stages
Figure 2.3.: EDE DES encryption
Decrypt Encrypt) instead of EEE (Encrypt Encrypt Encrypt).
2.3. Public-Key Cryptography
In public-key cryptography, also known as asymmetric cryptography, Alice and Bob each have
a key pair that consists of a public key and a private key. The private key is known only by
its owner while the public key is, well, public. A message encrypted with Alice’s public key can
only be decrypted by her private key. A message encrypted with Alice’s private key can only be
decrypted by her public key.
If Bob wants to send Alice a message which only she can read, he simply encrypts it with
Alice’s public key (PKA) and sends the resulting cipher text to Alice. Only someone with Alice’s
private key (SKA), which is supposed to be only Alice, can read the message. Even Bob cannot
decrypt the cipher text, but of course he knows the plain text since he wrote it. The operations
are shown in figure 2.5. Note that we modified the notation used previously.
In public-key cryptography, Alice does not need to trust anyone other than herself to secure
8
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Figure 2.4.: DED DES encryption
the keys. But, if Bob loses his private key then all messages she sends him will become public
knowledge.
Figure 2.5.: Public-key cryptography
Bob : (M)PKA = C
Alice : (C)SKA = M
2.3.1. RSA
One famous public-key algorithm is the Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) algorithm published
in 1977[10]. We will use this algorithm in our system for secure communication and digital
signatures. RSA works in the following way:
1. Choose two large primes p, q.
2. Compute n = pq
3. Compute φ(n) = (p− 1)(q − 1)
4. Choose an integer e such that gcd(e, φ(n)) = 12, i.e. e and φ(n) are coprime.
5. Release e as the public key.
6. Compute d such that ed = 1mod ((p− 1)(q − 1))
2The function gcd(x, y) returns the greatest common denominator of x and y.
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7. Now d is the private key.
8. To encrypt a message, C = M emodn
9. To decrypt the cipher text, M = Cdmodn
2.4. One-Way Hashing Functions
A hashing function is a special kind of function that takes a variable-length string, a pre-image,
and produces a fixed length string, called a hash value. A one-way hash function is a hash
function where it is very easy to compute the hash value from the pre-image but the reverse
operation is very hard. A good one-way hash function has the following properties[9]:
• Preimage resistant: It should be hard to find a message with a given hash value.
• Collision Resistant: It should be very difficult to find two messages with the same hash
value.
• Second Preimage Resistant: Given one message, it should be hard to find another one with
the same hash value.
Common uses of hash functions include password storage, verification of files and digital sig-
natures. Two very popular one-way hashing functions which we will use are Message-Digest
algorithm 5 (MD5) and the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA), which produce 128-bit and 160-bit
hash values respectively.
2.5. Digital Signatures Using Public-Key Cryptography
When sending a message, it is very important for the receiver to know that the person claiming
to be the sender is the real sender. In real life, this problem is solved by having the sender add
his signature to the document he is sending. When transmitting information electronically, we
can make use of the concept of Digital Signature. Many digital signature algorithms exit, most
rely on public-key cryptography. We will present here the most common algorithm, which we
will use in our system.
This algorithm works as follows: Alice wants to send a message to Bob, the message is not
necessarily a secret one, and Bob wants to make sure that it is from Alice.
1. Alice composes the message M 3 .
2. Alice calculates the one-way hash of the message, H(M).
3. Alice encrypts the hash value using her private key
(H(M))SKA = h
4. Alice sends M and h to Bob.
3The message M does not have to be legible, it could be an already encrypted message, a binary file etc.
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5. Bob simply calculates the one-way hash of M again, then decrypts h using Alice’s public
key, there are now two possibilities:
a) Alice is the real sender
(h)PKA = H(M)
b) Alice is not the real sender, the message has been tampered with
(h)PKA 6= H(M)
In the rest of this report, we will use the following notation for digital signatures:
(M)SigBob = {M, (H(M))SKBob}
Which means that the signature of the message M is composed of the message itself and a
one way hash of the message encrypted with the sender’s private key.
Note that this digital signature algorithm provides two additional features. The first one is
integrity, If a message is tampered with then the test by Bob will fail. The second feature is
non-repudiation, Alice cannot claim that she did not sign the message because she is the only
one who knows her private key. Of course Alice can claim that someone stole her private key,
this problem can be solved by also requiring Alice to encrypt a time stamp with the hash value
and whenever Alice’s private key is compromised she has to declare this.
2.6. Secret Splitting
Secret splitting is a technique that allows a message M to be divided into m parts. The message
can be recovered only if all m parts are available. One very simple way to achieve this is to use
the xor operation (⊕). If our message M is of length l bits, then we randomly generate another
string of l bits R. We next compute S :
M ⊕R = S
Now if we throw away M, the only way to recover the original message is to combine S and
R as follows:
S ⊕R = M
Note that each piece of the secret is worthless on its own, but if combined with the other part,
recovering M is a trivial task.
When we describe our system later in this report, we will use secret splitting to hide the
identity of the digital coin’s owner. If the customer double spends a coin, then all parts of the
customer’s identity will be available and he can be identified.
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Figure 2.6.: SSL
2.7. Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
In web applications such as online shopping, the standard way of securing the channel between
the host and the client for transmitting confidential information like personal data or credit
card information is to use Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) which gives both authentication (at
least for the shop) and encryption. The first task is authentication, where a host has to be
authenticated while authentication for the client is optional. In this step, the host and client
exchange certificates (assuming the client has one) that are signed by a Certification Authority
(CA). The certification authority may be the host server itself or a third party such as VeriSign.
Usually clients (web browsers) have a list of trusted CAs, if the CA is not known to them (i.e.
it is not a major CA), a warning is displayed. During the process of authentication, a master
key is generated by the client and sent to the host. This master key is used for encrypting data
sent between the host and the client by having each side generate its own keys derived from the
master key using psudorandom functions[11], the operations are shown in figure 2.6.
Because SSL has evolved over the years, when performing authentication, the host and client
will also agree on which algorithms to support. The choice is usually the strongest algorithms
supported by both sides. All of the above mentioned functionality on the host side is provided
by OpenSSL, which is an open source implementation of SSL.
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In this chapter we present the payment system that we will develop in the practical phase of
our project. The digital cash protocol we will use was first proposed by Schneier[7]. We will
use a modified version of this protocol given by Tewari, O’Mahony and Peirce[12]. We will first
present the various components of the system and then analyze it. A general overview of the
system can be seen in figure 3.1.
3.1. Introduction
3.1.1. Terminology
• Issuer : Responsible for the minting and detection of double spending of coins. It maintains
a database of coins that have been deposited and are no longer in circulation in the system.
• Bank : Maintains end-user accounts. It distributes and accepts coins from end-users. Issuer
and bank can be combined into one entity.
• Buyer/Customers/Users: Customers have accounts with banks from which they can with-
draw and deposit coins. They store coins in an electronic purse which is a smart phone or
a smart card in our system.
• Merchant : Users that can accept coins in exchange for products or services.
• Point of Sale (POS) Device: Secure off-line systems that act as intermediary during the
transfer of coins between two users. Black lists are downloaded to the device from a central
server at periodic intervals, along with the serial numbers of coins that have been deposited
more than once at the issuer .
The system requires two public-key pairs, the first is used for issuing coins and the second for
managing transaction lists. Table 3.1 shows which entity has access to which key
Table 3.1.: Key distribution
Issuer PKIssuer, SKIssuer PKTrans, SKTrans
Bank PKIssuer PKTrans, SKTrans
POS PKIssuer PKTrans, SKTrans
Users PKIssuer PKTrans
Each user has a UID signed by the issuer. The signed UID has the following form:
(UID)SigIssuer = {UID, (H(UID))SKIssuer}
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Figure 3.1.: Digital cash payment system overview
3.1.2. Blinding
In this protocol, each coin will have a field called a transaction list, used for detecting double
spenders. Each transaction list has a variable number of transaction items, each of which is a
result of one transfer of the coin. A transaction item consists of m identity strings (I 1 , I 2 ,...,
Im). Each of these identity strings is generated by splitting the identity of the user using the
secret splitting protocol. So one transaction item looks like this:

I1 = (I1L, I1R)
I1 = (I1L, I1R)
...
Im = (ImL, ImR)

Xoring the left and right parts of any identity string will reveal the identity of the user. This
is of course a major violation of anonymity which a user expects from any cash-like system, so
how is it a digital cash system?
Well, we should only be able to identify the identity of a user only if he is a double spender.
Therefore, we resort to a technique known as blinding. For each entry in the transaction item,
we randomly choose either the left or right half and set it to zero. So now there is no way to
reconstruct the user’s id. This operation is shown in figure 3.2. Note that:
9876⊕ 9596 = 1654⊕ 1438 = 4566⊕ 4670 = · · · = 2165⊕ 2973 = 9010⊕ 8410 = 1000 = UID
We later show how this is used to identify a double spender.
14
3.2 The Reusable Oﬄine Digital Cash Protocol
Figure 3.2.: Blinding
3.1.3. Coin Structure
A coin in our system has the following structure:
{SN, Denom, Val}SigIssuer, (H(SN, Denom, Val), TranList)SigTrans}
• Serial Number (SN): A unique system wide identifier.
• Denomination (Denom): The face value of the coin
• Validity (Val): The period of time for which this coin remains valid. This parameter limits
the size of the database at the issuer.
• Transaction List (TranList): A list of transaction items associated with each time the coin
is transferred from one user to another.
To bind a coin and its corresponding transaction list together, a hash of the first three fields
along with the transaction list are signed with the transaction secret key (SKTrans).
3.2. The Reusable Oﬄine Digital Cash Protocol
3.2.1. Withdrawal
In withdrawal, the customer acquires coins from the bank. When this process is done, the coins
are stored in the customer’s digital wallet, which in our system is his smart phone or smart card.
Withdrawal involves the following steps:
1. The user authenticates himself to the bank then submits his signed user ID (UID) to the
bank. The user asks the bank for a specific amount (AMT).
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2. The bank splits the UID m times to generate the first transaction item in the transaction
list. This transaction item is still unblinded. The number of times the UID is split, m,
controls how likely it is to discover a double spender as will be explained in 3.6. The bank
then sends the coin to the user.
Figure 3.3.: Withdrawal
3.2.2. Payment
Payment results in the transfer of coins from the customer to the merchant. The merchant has
a secure and trusted POS device.
1. Both the merchant and the user give their signed UID to the POS device.
2. The user sends the coins to the POS.
3. The POS makes sure the user is not in its locally stored black list (a double spender).
4. The POS makes sure the last transaction item in the transaction list belongs to the user.
5. If the above is successful, the POS randomly blinds either the right or left half of each
entry in the last transaction item of the transaction list to prevent the cash’s new owner
from identifying the previous owner.
6. The POS creates a new unblinded transaction item based on the merchant’s ID and at-
taches it to the coin.
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Figure 3.4.: Payment
3.2.3. Deposit
Once it is time to deposit a coin to get real cash, the following steps are performed:
1. The merchant gives the coins and his signed UID to the bank.
2. The bank compares the UID with the last transaction item in the transaction list to make
sure they are not stolen.
3. The bank forwards the coins to the issuer.
4. The issuer makes sure that no previously deposited coins have the same serial numbers as
the current ones and coin’s serial number and transaction list are added to the database.
Figure 3.5.: Deposit
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3.2.4. Identification of Double Spenders
If the issuer finds that he has been given a coin that has already been spent then identifying
the double spender occurs as follows: compare all transaction items in the transaction lists of
the two coins, when a transaction item is found where either two left or two right halves are
the same, then look in that transaction item for two entries in which different parts of the entry
have been blinded and xor those parts. The result is the UID of the double spender.
In this way, the chance of identifying a double spender depends on two factors:
1. The number of entries in each transaction item (m).
2. The number of times the same coin is spent by the same user (K ).
Probability of detection = 1−
(
1
2
)m(K−1)
So, for m=5 and K =2, the probability of being caught is 96.87%.
Figure 3.6.: Identifying Double Spenders
Once the double spender is identified, his identity can be distributed to merchants to add it
to the black list of their POSs so that they do not accept payment from this customer.
3.3. Application of the Digital Cash Payment Protocol
We will now show how the protocol given above will be applied in the practical phase of our
project. We will first define two categories of payment, local and remote. Next, we show how
our protocol works with each category and across categories.
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3.3.1. Remote and Local Payment
Remote payment (RP) refers to the situation where the customer and the merchant perform the
transaction through a network connection. Paying from a smart phone or a smart card to an
online store is a remote payment.
Local payment (LP) on the other hand takes place when the customer and the merchant are
both using the same device to make and accept the payment. This means that paying from your
smart phone at the checkout point of a store or to your friend’s phone are both local payments.
3.3.2. Remote Payment Protocol
At the beginning of a remote payment, the unblinded coin is assumed to be available on the
customer’s device. The customer will simply upload the coin, or coins, and his signed UID to the
merchant. They both go through the merchant’s POS and a customer is given a success/failure
message at the end. The security of coin transmission is ensured by requiring the use of the
SSL protocol in the communication procedure. The protocol is shown in figure 3.7. The fact
that the POS is at the merchant’s side is a weak point of the system because we are putting
some trust into the merchant not to peek into our coins and identify us. This problem can be
overcome by having a certification system for merchants but it still prevents the system from
being a perfect one.
The reason for not having the POS on the customer’s side is that we will not be able to detect
double spenders this way. If we accept an already blinded coin from the customer, then he can
spend the same blinded coin multiple times and the issuer will only know that a certain coin
was double spent without being able to identify the double spender.
Figure 3.7.: Remote Payment
3.3.3. Local Payment Protocol
The local payment protocol starts with the merchant determining the amount to be paid. The
coin is encrypted during transmission from the customer to the merchant to avoid having a third
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party steal it as shown in figure 3.8. Note that during the third time interval, the amount to
be paid may be one or more coins. Our standard system will not be required to return change
back form the merchant to the customer. If returning change is required, a new local payment
process will have to be initiated where the roles are switched.
Figure 3.8.: Local Payment
3.4. Features of the System
We have seen that our system is not a perfect replacement of cash for several reasons including
the fact that in remote payment it requires a degree of trust in the merchant. This is not a real
disappointment since cash was not designed for these kinds of payment so this risk is a trade-off
for being able to use our cash in a nontraditional manner.
Our system also has some nice features not available in traditional cash:
1. Recoverabilty : We can make cash recoverable in the case that it is lost. This can be done
by requiring the user to reveal his identity and request a previously withdrawn coin. In
the case that a coin is double spent, catching the user will be trivial since the bank has
recorded that he withdrew the same coin multiple times.
2. Theft : spending stolen coins is not an easy task. The POS requires that the coin’s last
transaction item and the signed UID match, if one of them is not available, the coin cannot
be spent.
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In this chapter and the next one we will study in detail the technologies required to implement
our system. Here, will look at mobile technology and Bluetooth. Our aim is to enable users
to use the mobile devices to store and transfer digital cash. We first begin by looking at the
available methods of communication for mobile devices. We then look at the the different mobile
platforms and mobile development environments.
We then shift our focus to Bluetooth technology which we will use in our system. We present
the Bluetooth protocol stack and Bluetooth network connections. We will also discuss Bluetooth
security to determine its suitability for our system.
4.1. Mobile Technology
4.1.1. Method of Communication
In describing our system, we stated that a means of communication between mobile devices (and
possibly computers) is needed to transfer digital cash. We quickly came to the conclusion that
due to their low market penetration and high cost, using online means of communication such
as General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) or Enhanced Data rates for GSM Evolution (EDGE)
technologies will not be realistic. We therefore chose to use oﬄine means of communication.
The two dominant oﬄine communication technologies available in mobile phones are infrared
(IR) and Bluetooth. Our decision will be based on the following criteria: market penetration,
security and the availability of APIs for writing PC applications.
Looking at the first criterion, market penetration, it is clear that the availability of IR on
mainstream smart phones is low and declining. At the same time Bluetooth is always an option
on these phones. On the more high end smart phones, IR is almost always an option with
Bluetooth quickly catching up.
As for security, IR does not specify any security measures for data transfer, yet it is considered
relatively secure because a line of sight is needed for data transfer . Additional security for IR
will have to be implemented on the application level[13]. Bluetooth provides a set of standard
security protocols that give confidentiality and authentication. In the Symbian implementation,
the level of security is determined by the receiver which enforces certain security constraints on
incoming connections [14].
Finally, we look at the availability of APIs for writing application programs. Our focus here is
on the Linux operating system which is our development platform. For Bluetooth, we have the
BlueZ C library available, which is a powerful Bluetooth communications stack with extensive
APIs that allows a user to fully exploit all local Bluetooth resources. The BlueZ library suffers
from the lack of documentation, but tutorials are available online[15]. As for IR, the OpenOBEX
C library is available with good documentation.
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Based on the discussion above, we opted for Bluetooth, mainly because of its wide availability,
and also for the availability of complete APIs for it.
4.1.2. Mobile Platforms
Before setting out to develop a mobile payment solution, it is important to determine the target
mobile platform(s). In this section, we present the criteria for choosing a platform and how
these criteria were applied when deciding which platform to use.
When choosing a mobile platform, we focused on the following criteria in the order of impor-
tance:
• The platform’s popularity (in the local market).
• The platform should be tightly coupled with the communication method we chose to use,
which is Bluetooth.
• The options available for writing applications for our chosen platform. This includes the
possible programming languages that can be used for application development and the
available integrated development environments (IDEs).
• The availability of sufficient documentation for the chosen platform.
• The ease with which applications can be ported to different devices using the same plat-
form.
• The availability of cryptographic programming libraries for the chosen platform.
We narrowed the scope of our search to include smart phone platforms only. We define a smart
phone as an openly programmable handheld device that integrates the functionality of a mobile
phone and a personal digital assistant[16]. The following platforms were considered: Symbian,
Palm OS and Windows Mobile. Table 4.1, at the end of this chapter, gives a comparison of
these platforms based on the criteria mentioned above.
Based on the comparison above, we made the choice of going with the Symbian platform. The
major downside to making this choice is the lack of open cryptography libraries for this platform,
which means that we will either have to implement these if we choose Symbian C++ as our
development language, or we can opt for J2ME. A detailed discussion of the two languages is
given in the next section.
4.1.3. Symbian C++ vs. Java Micro Edition
After choosing our main development platform for mobile phones, Symbian, we need to decide
on a programming language to use for that platform. The two main languages available for
Symbian are Symbian C++ and Java 2 Micro Edition (J2ME). Our main focus here is on the
availability of needed libraries for development, portability, stability and the degree of control
over the device available to us by the programming language.
Formally, J2ME is a Java specification, Java ME was developed under the Java Community
Process as Java Specification Requirement (JSR) 68 [21]. This specification aims at providing
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a set of Java APIs for the development of programs on resource constrained devices. Sun
Microsystems, the designer of Java and J2ME, does not provide its own runtime environment
for J2ME. Instead, each manufacturer of J2ME devices has to provide his own implementation,
which causes some portability problems between different platforms.
J2ME devices generally provide an implementation of the basic J2ME specification (JSR 68).
In addition to that, they will also provide the implementation of additional JSRs based of their
resources and capabilities. Since (almost) all Symbian devices provide Bluetooth functionality,
we can find that JSR 82 (Bluetooth Java API) is implemented in those devices[22, 23]. We also
found that JSR 75 (PDA Optional Packages for the J2ME Platform, providing access to the file
systems of smart phones) is implemented on Symbian as well as most other J2ME devices[24].
For our application, cryptographic libraries will be needed. Because of the resource constraints
in J2ME devices, cryptographic functionality in is not part of J2ME and most devices do not
implement any cryptographic JSRs. Fortunately, The Legion of the Bouncy Castle open source
project provides a lightweight cryptographic API that should be appropriate for our needs[25].
Portability is one of the major pluses for J2ME. Although the runtime environment is im-
plemented by device manufacturers, as mentioned above, using standard J2ME code generally
means that the same program can be used on different platforms with minimal change.
Because of its nature, Java is capable of providing more stable and secure programs than
Symbian C++. The Java Virtual Machine (JVM) on the device takes care of garbage collection
and memory management. Additionally, the JVM performs and verifies the byte code before
attempting to execute it. This step ensures that the program does not pose a risk to system
security by failing to uphold rules of the Java language[26].
J2ME is not the native language of the Symbian platform and most other smart phone plat-
forms. This means that J2ME does not give one as much control of the system resources as
the native language. In Symbian, for example, it is not possible to have J2ME applications
run as services in the background as can be done with Symbian C++. Additionally, J2ME
usually provides much less APIs than the native language. For example, in the case of J2ME,
the Bluetooth API (JSR 82) does not give the user the needed interfaces for flushing a cache of
previously detected devices during device discovery or obtaining Bluetooth signal strength, two
things that are available from Symbian C++[27].
Table 4.2, at the end of this chapter, contains a brief comparison between J2ME and Symbian
C++.
Based on the above discussion, we decided to go with J2ME mainly because it is simpler than
Symbian C++ and because it has openly available cryptographic libraries.
4.2. Bluetooth Technology from a Developer’s Point of View
4.2.1. Bluetooth Protocol Stack
The Bluetooth protocol is divided into several layers collectively known as the Bluetooth protocol
stack, each of which provides well defined operations to the layer above it. Each Bluetooth layer
also corresponds to a protocol. The layer structure does not follow any standard model such as
the TCP/IP or 802 models, but there currently are attempts to modify Bluetooth to make it
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more compatible with the 802 model[28].
The Bluetooth protocol stack is shown in figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1.: Bluetooth protocol stack
The Radio layer supports frequency hopping over 79 frequencies separated by 1MHz in the
range 2402 - 2480 MHz. The radio layer operates in three different power classes which control
the range of the Bluetooth signal. Gaussian frequency shift keying (GFSK) is used for modula-
tion. In GFSK a binary ”1” is represented by a positive frequency deviation and a binary “0”
is represented by a negative frequency deviation.
The baseband layer controls the movement of packets over the radio link. It is capable of han-
dling two types of links: Synchronous Connection-oriented links (SCO) used for voice transmis-
sion and Asynchronous Connection-less links (ACL) used for data transmission. The baseband
layer supports fifteen different types of packets, five of which are defined for both SCO and ACL,
six only for ACL and one only for SCO. Each of these packets has the structure shown in figure
4.2. Error correction, flow control and synchronization take place in this layer[29].
The Link Manager Protocol (LMP) manages the connection established by lower layers. Here,
tasks like link setup, authentication, encryption and configuration are performed.
The Host Controller Interface (HCI) is the final layer in the Bluetooth stack implemented in
hardware. It provides the interface to lower layers in the form of control and status registers.
The Logical Link Control and Adaption Protocol (L2CAP) provides connection-oriented and
Figure 4.2.: Bluetooth packet format
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connection-less data services to the higher level protocols. It allows higher level protocols to
exchange data in packets with a maximum size of 64KB.
Descriptions of the functionality of the TCS, SDP and RFCOMM protocols are given in the
next subsection.
4.2.2. Bluetooth Connection Establishment
Bluetooth connection establishment goes through the following steps:
1. Inquiry : this step has to be performed only if the two devices have not previously seen each
other. In this step, the Bluetooth device only needs to find the unique 48-bit Bluetooth
address for each nearby device. To simplify things, Bluetooth devices will usually have a
Bluetooth friendly name so users will not have to deal directly with the Bluetooth address.
2. Paging : in paging, the clocks of the two communicating Bluetooth devices are synchro-
nized. This synchronization is required so that both devices will later follow the same
frequency hopping sequence.
3. Service Discovery: where the Service Discovery Protocol (SDP) is used. In it, the client
application using Bluetooth communication asks the server application to which it is con-
necting to inform it about the services it provides. This protocol is needed so as not to
have to attach specific services to specific ports on the Bluetooth device as we do in the
TCP/IP model because the number of available ports in Bluetooth devices is very small.
Because we can have a huge number of server applications providing different services, we
need a way to uniquely identify each different service. The answer to this problem is to
use a UUID (Universally Unique Identifier) to identify a service. The UUID is simply a
128-bit number generated using a well defined method that guarantees its uniqueness. In
this way, service discovery reduces to the exchange of a single number between the client
and the server applications.
The next step in connection establishment is the establishment of L2CAP channel. Optionally,
further channels using higher protocols can be established on top of this one. A Radio Frequency
Communications Protocol (RFCOMM) channel is usually established on top of the L2CAP
channel. RFCOMM emulates a serial port and it was designed to allow applications that work
with serial ports to work with Bluetooth.
The final step is authentication, it is an optional one. It will be discussed later in this chapter.
4.2.3. Bluetooth Networks
A Bluetooth network is called a piconet. The device that provides a service is the master, all
other devices are slaves. Among other things, the master controls the hopping sequence and all
slaves have to synchronize with the master to follow the same hopping sequence. A piconet may
contain exactly one master and up to seven slaves. A piconet with one master and one slave is
a point-to-point piconet. A piconet with one master and multiple slaves is a point-to-multipoint
piconet. The concept of master and slave in a Bluetooth connection can be a confusing one.
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Figure 4.3.: Service Discovery Protocol
Initially, the master is the device initiating the connection. Once the link has been established,
the master is dynamically elected and a master/slave switch can takes place.
In a scatternet, a master may serve as master in only one piconet, but it can be a slave in
other piconets at the same time a slave can be a slave in multiple piconets. Scatternet support
depends on hardware an software support, for example, it is not possible to establish scatternets
with the RFCOMM protocol.
In the case of point-to-multipoint piconets, slaves can communicate with each other only
through the master. The different Bluetooth network configurations are shown in figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4.: Three piconets forming two scatternets
4.2.4. Bluetooth Security
An important decision in the implementation of our system is whether it suffices to use the
security provided by the basic Bluetooth protocol or if we should add our own security layer.
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The issue of security is important because we want to prevent the stealing of digital cash during
transfer.
In Bluetooth, security is divided into three security modes[30]:
• Security Mode 1: non-secure.
• Security Mode 2: service level enforced security.
• Security Mode 3: link level enforced security.
In security mode 2, security is left to the application, meaning that connection establishment is
not necessarily secure. In mode 3, security is enforced at connection-establishment time. Mode
3 is the only mode in which authentication is always required and encryption is enforced by the
master, so in the case that the slave does not support authentication, or if it does not agree
to encrypt the connection if the master requires it, then the connection is terminated. For this
reason analysing security mode 3 will make the most sense for an application requiring a high
degree of security like ours.
4.2.4.1. Pairing
The first step in establishing a secure connection is pairing. Pairing ends with the two devices
authenticating each other. The process of pairing involves the following:
1. Initialization
The purpose of initialization is to create the initialization key (Kinit). As shown in figure
4.51, this process requires:
a) Each device’s unique 48-bit BD_ADDR, which each device transmits if it is in dis-
coverable mode.
b) PIN code (specification calls for a 16 byte pin, but most manufacturers require a
much shorter PIN).
c) IN_RAND, a 128-bit random number. Note that this number is transmitted in plain
text.
2. Link Key
The next step is to create the link key (Kab). To do this, each side generates a 128-bit
random number called LK_RAND. After xoring it with Kinit from the previous step, each
LK_RAND is sent to the other device. So, now each device has its own LK_RAND and
that of the other device. Using the E21 algorithm, the link key is generated as shown in
figure 4.6.
3. Authentication
In this process we have two sides, a claimant (claiming a certain identity) and a verifier.
1Details of the E algorithms are not presented in this text.
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Figure 4.5.: Creation of the initialization key
The verifier sends the claimant a 128-bit plain text random number AU_RAND. The
claimant then calculates a 32 bit SRES using the E1 algorithm and sends it back to the
verifier. Verification is complete if the verifier generates the same SRES as the claimant,
otherwise authentication fails. In the next step, the verifier and claimant exchange roles
to provide mutual authentication. This process is shown in figure 4.7.
4.2.4.2. Encryption
The next step in this process is encryption. Here, an encryption key (Kc) is generated. The
Kc is generated using the E3 algorithm as follows: Kc = E3(Kab,EN_RAND,COF). Where
EN_RAND is a random 128 bit number and COF is a 96 bit ciphering offset derived from the
BD_ADDR (not discussed here). Kc is next used to generate the payload key Kp by means of
an algorithm called E0. Kp is the key used for encryption and decryption.
4.2.4.3. Cracking Bluetooth Security
After the lengthy discussion above, it is disappointing to say that cracking the security of the
system takes 0.6 seconds on a 3GHz Pentium IV computer when using a 4-digit PIN[31]! The
details of cracking the system are pretty mathematical and we will not go into them, but it is
worth noting again that IN_RAND, AU_RAND and SRES are all transferred in plain text.
4.2.4.4. Final Judgement
Due to the weakness of Bluetooth security, as outlined above, we decided to add security features
to our payment application. Adding security to our application will also help us use more
standardized security protocols like RSA and therefore be able to use already existing electronic
payment schemes.
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Figure 4.6.: Generation of Kab
Figure 4.7.: Authentication
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Table 4.1.: Comparison of different mobile platforms
Symbian Palm OS WindowsMobile
Popularity
By far the most
popular smart
phone platform
(especially with
Nokia and Sony
Ericsson phones)
Very low market
share
Second most
popular
Bluetooth
All Symbian
phones have
Bluetooth.
Bluetooth API is
part of standard
Symbian C++.
Bluetooth is not
available as an
option on all Palm
OS smart phones
(or PDAs). Where
available
Bluetooth libraries
from PalmOne can
be used [17].
Available on most
devices running
this platform.
Where available,
there are multiple
Bluetooth libraries
to choose from.
Programming
Options
Symbian C++,
Java Micro
Edition, Python
C, C++
C++ and .NET
Compact (C#,
VB.NET,
Managed C++)
Documentation Extensive Extensive Extensive
Portability
Portable (except
for user
interface)[18]
Highly portable Highly portable
Cryptographic
libraries
Symbian C++
cryptography
libraries are not
openly available
[19]. Third party
J2ME crypto
libraries are
available.
Openly
available[20]
Several
cryptographic
libraries available
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Table 4.2.: Symbian C++ vs. J2ME
J2ME Symbian C++
Available libraries All needed libraries found Cryptography libraries
missing
Completeness of
libraries
Some are incomplete
providing only basic
functionality
Gives most complete
libraries
Portability In theory, highly portable.
In practice it can be a
tedious task to port
programs from Symbian to
non-Symbian platforms
Portable among different
versions of Symbian
platform. Not portable to
other platforms
Security and stability J2ME provides more secure
and stable applications
Security and stability
depend on application
programmer
Control over system Basic control Maximum possible control
Documentation Very extensive Extensive, but less than
J2ME
Complexity A subset of Java, therefore
not very different form
standard Java.
Complex. Attempts to use
C++, which is an object
oriented language, as an
event based language
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5. Smart Card Technology
Smart cards are simple plastic cards, just the size of a credit card, with a microprocessor and
memory embedded inside it, or with only memory.
Beside its tiny little structure it has many uses and wide variety of applications such as
e-wallet, keys to various doors, etc.
Smart cards hold these data within different files, and these data is visible to its program
depending on the operating system of the smart card. These data files are arranged in a file
system[32].
5.1. Advantages of Smart Cards
There are two main advantages for smart cards, flexibility and security.
5.1.1. Flexibility
Smart card can contain our cash, id, personal information at the same time, and also we can
replace a smart card if lost. Another point, that some smart cards have PIN number, so that
when some one use it with a wrong password, the card reader will deactivate it.
5.1.2. Security
The main advantage in Smart Cards is that we don’t need online connection to access physical
places. Smart cards can be encrypted, so we can encrypt and decrypt information securely.
5.2. Benefits of Smart Cards
There are many benefits of smart cards, the three main ones are:
• Portability.
• Increasing data storage capacity.
• Reliability that is virtually unaffected by electrical and magnetic fields.
5.3. Comparison Between Several Types of Smart Cards
There are four types of Smart Cards, Contact, Contactless, Combo and Hybrid smart cards.
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5.3.1. Contact Smart Card
Contact smart card has single embedded integrated circuit chip.
There are two types of this card:
• Chip contains only memory (they are also called IC Memory Cards): they are less expensive
than the chip contains microprocessor. They offer less security, so we can’t use it to make
highly secure payments.
• Chip contains memory and microprocessor (they are called IC microprocessor smart cards):
in these cards, there is a controller that has a good degree of intelligence, so we can delete,
add and update information securely.
There are some kinds of chips that contain a very complex microprocessor that contains built
in security features for preventing unauthorized access.
5.3.2. Contactless Smart Card
It contains an embedded antenna instead of the contact pads. In this type of smart card, we
don’t have to insert the card in a smart card reader. Instead, they must pass through a range
of radio frequency acceptor to read and store information in the memory.
5.3.3. Combo Smart Card
This type of smart cards has one smart chip embedded in it, and can be accessed by embedded
antenna or by the contact pads, it provides high security and is easy to use.
5.3.4. Hybrid Smart Card
It has two or more embedded chips in it, a contactless smart chip with its antenna, and a contact
smart chip with its contact pads.
5.4. Smart Card Components
The size of memory in any smart card is small, but in spite of that, it contains very important
data such as cryptographic key, identification data....
There are about three types of them embedded in the smart card chip. Each of these memories
contains different pieces of information.
There are about seven main components in the smart card:
1. About 32 bit CPU core.
2. Read Only Memory (ROM): This Type of memory contains the operating system, some
particular application, instructions and constants for the smart card. All these things
are included in read only memory, because changing any information is not allowed. It
contains up to 224 Kbytes.
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3. Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory (EEPROM): It is a nonvolatile
memory. Data and program code can be written to and read from this kind of memory
under the control of the operating system. It contains up to 66 Kbytes.
4. Random Access Memory (RAM): This is the processors working memory. This kind of
memories is volatile, so that when the chip’s power is switched off all the data stored in it
are lost. It contains up to 8 Kbytes.
5. Serial I/O interface
6. Internal clock generator
7. Crypto processors (1088 bit modular arithmetic processors, hardware data encryption
standard accelerator, advanced encryption standard)
Figure 5.1 shows the components of the smart card.
Figure 5.1.: Memory in smart cards
5.5. Smart card reader
A smart card reader/writer is used to read data from and write data to smart card. They come
with some security features such as a secure PIN entry. Some of them must be plugged in the
USB port, others are built in the keyboard. We use smart card readers to program our smart
card, so that this reader must support the protocols we will use. One of the most readers in use,
that read ISO 7816 compliant cards[34].
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5.6. Memory and Microprocessor Smart Card
The most common and least expensive smart cards are memory cards. This type of smart
cards, contain EEPROM (Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory), non volatile
memory. Because it is non volatile, when we remove the card from the reader, power is cut off,
card stores the data. In some memory cards, the data can be locked only by a PIN of 3 to 8
digit numbers.
On the other side microprocessor cards contain ROM, RAM and EEPROM with 8 or 16 bit
microprocessor. The operating system is in the ROM to manage the file system in EEPROM
and to run desired functions in RAM.
Figure 5.2.: Non-cryptographic smart cards
As we see in memory cards in figure 5.2, there is no direct connection between the memory
and the contacts. The operating system is responsible for the security of the data in memory
because the access conditions are controlled by the operating system.
Figure 5.3.: Cryptographic smart card
When we add microprocessor in figure 5.3, our smart cards can now handle complex mathe-
matical computations. We don’t need to add accelerator for the cryptographic functions because
the internal clock rate of micro-controllers is 3 to 5 MHz[32].
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5.7. Standards
To avoid carrying Different cards for different applications, different standards were generated
for multifunctional cards. An important standard is EMV (Europay, MasterCard and Visa),
which contains description for all the aspects of smart cards. The EMV standard is used for
authenticating credit and debit card payments. It also defines the interaction at the data,
application and physical levels between the cards and the card processing devices[33]. EMV
uses many different encryption algorithms such as RSA and SHA to provide authentication of
the card to the processing terminal. EMV also allows the user to enter a PIN, but this depends
on how we program the card[33].
The other important standard is the ISO 7816. This standard came in four parts for physical
characteristics of the smart card, dimensions and locations of the contact pads, electronic signals
and the file structure security respectively.
The contact pads are shown in table 5.1:
Table 5.1.: Smart card contact pads
Contact Pad Use
1 Power supply to the microprocessor chip
2 Reset line
3 CLK
4 No use
5 GND
6 VPP (to program EEPROM)
7 I/O
8 No use
Figure 5.4.: Smart card contact pads
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5.8. Energy for smart card
In contact smart cards, there are contact pads at one corner of it. Some of these pads are used
to supply the necessary energy and to communicate via direct electrical contact with the reader.
In contact less smart cards, we don’t need to insert them in a reader.They have small wire
loop embedded inside, which is used to supply the energy to the card and to communicate with
the reader.
When we put the card in the RF of the reader, a current is created in the wire loop and used
as an energy source[32].
5.9. The data files in smart card
All smart cards have complete hierarchical file management systems. The characteristics of
the memory that contains them affects the nature file management system, and because the
EEPROM is divided into pages that cant be written or erased unlimited number of times, so
there are special file attributes that allow information to be stored redundantly so it can be
corrected if necessary.
The most important thing is that the file management system for smart cards has an object
oriented structure, so that all the information of the file is stored in the file itself, and we must
select a file before performing any action. Files in object oriented is divided into two parts, the
first one is the file header which contains the information about the layout and structure of the
file and its access conditions, and the second part contains the data (file body) linked to the file
header by a pointer as shown in figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5.: Smart card files
The file header and the file body are located on separate pages, so that any error in the file
body does not affect the access conditions in the file header. (Some operating systems offer the
option of addressing the file body from two different headers).
As described in figures 5.6 and 5.7, there are three categories of files for smart cards:
1. The first one is the master file (MF) which is the root directory, it is selected after the
card is reset, it contains all the other directories and files.
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2. The second one is the directory file (Dedicated files DFs) in which other DFs and EFs can
be grouped together.
3. The third one consists of the files that contain the user data (Elementary files EFs). EFs
can be divided into external World (Working EFs) and another for the operating system
(Internal EFs). It is allocated below MF and DF to be stored in a minimum amount of
memory.
• Working EFs: The data that stored here are not used by the operating system. It
contains all the data that external world uses.
• Internal EFs: It stores data for the operating system itself (Secret Keys, Program
Code).
Smart cards hold the data within different files, those files are only visible to its program
depending on the operating system of the card. The data files are arranged in a file system such
as Linux directory structure[32].
Figure 5.6.: Smart card file tree
5.10. Smart Card Operating System
Many smart cards use their own operating systems for communication and functions, and these
operating systems go beyond the simple functions supplied by ISO7816 standards[32].
We use the smart card operating system for:
1. Transferring the data to and from the smart card
2. Control the execution of the command
3. Managing files
4. Managing and executing the cryptographic algorithms
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Figure 5.7.: Smart card file hierarchy
5. Managing and executing the program codes
We have many types of smart cards that we have to choose among them, with different size
of memories and different types of operating systems. Among these smart cards we have java,
Multi-Application Operating System (MULTOS) and ACR38 smart cards. Java and MULTOS
smart cards are widely used for highly secured applications, but their prices are very expensive
comparing with ACR38 that can achieve our goal.
ACR38 is a low cost, it also provides the solution where the security of a smart card is required.
These smart cards are secured enough for our application we want to build, because this type of
cards come with DES/Triple DES and also with a 8 Kbytes of EEPROM for user application.
To use any smart card, we need a smart card reader/writer as mentioned above. We choose
the ACR38 smart card reader/writer because it is less expensive comparing with the java and
MULTOS smart card reader/writer and it is also easy to use and install. These smart cards
reader/writer support our standards mentioned above, and can read and write all microprocessor
cards.
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Conclusion and Future Work
In this report we looked at e-commerce systems and e-commerce payment solutions. We intro-
duced and discussed the concept of digital cash. We then presented a reusable oﬄine digital cash
system and analyzed it. Finally, we studied the various technologies we will use in our project:
mobile technology, Bluetooth and smartphone technology and presented our implementation
choices for these technologies.
After completeing the study of our system, we will begin the practical phase starting next
semester. We already began learning some of the technologies we will need. Our e-commerce
content management system is already set up and functioning. We have also started experi-
menting with the programming of mobile devices and Bluetooth programming. Additionally, we
expect our smart card development kit available before the start of next semester.
During the practical phase, we will take on the task of developing the following components
of our system:
1. E-Commerce payment module: We need to implement a module for the e-commerce man-
agement system that will enable users to upload their coins to the online store. The module
will have the functionality of a POS.
2. Mobile device application: This application will be in charge of storing received coins
on the device, sending coins to other payment devices for remote or local payments and
managing Bluetooth communication.
3. Smart card application: This application will take care of transferring coins to smart cards
and withdrawing coins from a smart card.
4. Bank system: The bank system will have to accept cash from users and in return send
digital coins to their payment devices. It will also manage the process of cashing digital
coins by merchants.
5. Issuer system: This system has the task of issuing coins and distributing them to banks.
It will also take care of the identification of double spenders and the management of lost
coins.
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A. List of Abbreviations
ACL Asynchronous Connection-Less link
API Application Programming Interface
B2B Business to Business
B2C Business to Consumer
C2C Consumer to Consumer
CA Certification Authority
CPU Central Processing Unit
CT-API Card Terminal Application Programming Interface
DES Data Encryption Standard
DF Dedicated File
E-Commerce Electronic Commerce
E-Business Electronic Business
EDE Encrypt Decrypt Encrypt
EDGE Enhanced Data rates for GSM Evolution
EEE Encrypt Encrypt Encrypt
EEPROM Electronically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
EF Elementary File
EMV Europay, MasterCard and Visa
GFSK Gaussian Frequency Shift Keying
GPRS General Packet Radio Service
HCI Host Controller Interface
HTSI Host-Transport Service-Interface
IC Integrated Circuit
IDE Integrated Development Environment
A1
IR Infrared
ISO International Organization for Standardization
J2ME Java 2 Platform, Micro Edition
JCP Java Community Process
JSR Java Specification Requirement
JVM Java Virtual Machine
L2CAP Logical Link Control and Adaption Protocol
LMP Link Manager Protocol
LP Local Payment
MD5 Message Digest Algorithm 5
MF Master File
MULTOS Multi-Application Operating System
OBEX OBject EXchange
OCF Open Card Framework
OS Operating System
P2P Peer to Peer
PDA Personal Digital Assistant
PIN Personal Identification Number
POS Point Of Sale
RAM Random Access Memory
ROM Read Only Memory
RFCOMM Radio Frequency Communications Protocol
RP Remote Payment
RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
SCO Synchronous Connection-Oriented link
SDP Service Discovery Protocol
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
A2
TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
TCS Telephony Control Specification
USB Universal Serial Bus
UUID Universally Unique Identifier
A3
